

## Sequoyah 1

### 3Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

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#### Initiating Events

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#### Mitigating Systems

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#### Barrier Integrity



**Significance:** Apr 05, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

##### **Inadequate Instructions for Controlling Shield Building Breaches**

Green. Inadequate technical guidance was identified because the associated procedure did not contain the necessary steps to ensure that multiple breaches of the shield building would be adequately controlled.

This inspector-identified finding was determined to be a non-cited violation of (NCV) Technical Specification 6.8.1.a. It was more than minor, because if left uncorrected it could result in the actual shield building breached area exceeding the margin of operability for the emergency gas treatment system. The finding also affected the configuration control attribute of the containment barrier. The finding is of very low safety significance because the actual margin was not exceeded. It was also considered to constitute a deficiency in the cross-cutting element of Problem Identification and Resolution.

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

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#### Emergency Preparedness

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#### Occupational Radiation Safety

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#### Public Radiation Safety

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## Physical Protection

**Significance:**  Nov 19, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Inadequate Personnel Search Prior to Entry into Protected Area**

A non-cited violation was identified for the licensee's failure to comply with Section 5.3.1 of the Physical Security Plan and Section 3.3 B of Security Instruction No.1, in that on September 13, 2002, security officers failed to perform a physical search of an individual who had previously alarmed the explosives detector, prior to allowing the individual access to the protected area.

The finding was of very low safety significance in that, using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process, it was identified as a vulnerability in access control, without a malevolent act, and without two similar findings in four quarters.

Inspection Report# : [2002007\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:** SL-IV Dec 28, 2001

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: VIO Violation

### **DISCRIMINATION AGAINST A CONTRACT SECURITY OFFICER**

The NRC determined that a violation of 10 CFR 50.7, Employee Protection, occurred on April 19, 2000 when the licensee discriminated against a contract security officer as a result of engaging in protected activity. Specifically, the individual objection to being instructed not to follow Physical Security Instruction PHYSI-32, which was part of his assigned responsibilities.

The violation had very low safety significance because the uncertainty of the intent of the verbal communications, and the low underlying safeguards significance of the procedural violation (i.e., the procedure was subsequently revised to allow security guards the discretion to conduct a physical search instead of requiring an individual to remove his or her shoes and process through the metal detector again).

Inspection Report# : [2001007\(pdf\)](#)

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## Miscellaneous

**Significance:** SL-II Jun 30, 2001

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: VIO Violation

### **EMPLOYEE PROTECTED ACTIVITY**

On February 7, 2000, a Severity Level II violation with civil penalty was issued to the licensee. The violation was not site-specific and involved employment discrimination contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.7, "Employee Protection," in that the licensee did not select a former employee to a competitive position in the corporate chemistry organization in 1996, due, at least in part, to his engagement in protected activities. On January 22, 2001, the licensee denied the violation and on May 4, an Order was issued sustaining the violation and imposing the civil penalty. On June 1, TVA requested an enforcement hearing on the Order.

Inspection Report# : [2001002\(pdf\)](#)

Last modified : December 01, 2003